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THE LAW TODAY ON STATE COURT
CONFESSION ADMISSIBILITY
For a seven year period, from 1944 to 1951, the United States Supreme
Court insisted that state courts determine a confession's admissibility on
the basis of whether or not it had been obtained by "inherent coersion."
1
In three cases since 1951, however, the Court has re-established the original
voluntary-trustworthy test which had been used prior to 1944. The most
recent decision to this effect is Stein v. New York, 2 which was decided on
June 15, 1953. The Steiv case also made two other very important departures
from views previously held by the Court upon the matter of confession ad-
missibility.
It will be recalled that in the case of Haley v. Ohio a 5-4 majority of the
Court said that a conviction must be reversed even though without the
coerced confession there might- have been sufficient evidence to support the
verdict.3 In theL Stein case, however, the Court held that a state conviction
which was supportable by other evidence would stand even though a coerced
confession had been used at the trial. Defense counsel in the Stein case had
requested a jury instruction to the effect that if the jury found the con-
fession to have been coerced they must return a verdict of acquittal. The
trial judge's refusal to give this instruction was held to be proper. The
majority of the Supreme Court expressed the view that "coerced confessions
are not more stained with illegality than other evidence obtained in violation
of law". The majority opinion also made the point that the Fourteenth
Amendment of the United States Constitution is not a rigid exclusionary
rule of evidence but only a guarantee against convictions upon untrustworthy
evidence.
The Court's opinion in the Stein case also quite clearly indicated that
there is nothing inherently wrong about a lengthy interrogation. It does
appear, however, that during a lengthy interrogation time must be taken
out for eating, drinking, and rest. As to just what is required will depend
upon the particular case. The interrogator will have to exercise his own
discretion as to what is reasonable under the circumstances.
Until the Stein case the'Supreme Court seemed to view an interrogation
by several interrogators operating in relays as an inherently coercive practice.
The Stein case opinion, however, does not consider the practice sQ inherently
oppressive as to necessarily "overwhelm the suspect's power of resistance".
Relay questioning, of course, will always be a factor for consideration in
determining the voluntariness or trustworthiness of a confession, but it will
not automatically render a confession inadmissible as evidence. Nevertheless,
the better interrogation practice, for legal as well as psychological con-
siderations, is to avoid relay interrogations and entrust the task of a criminal
interrogation to one, or at most two, interrogators.4
1. The "inherent coercion" rule was first set forth in Ashcraft v. Tennessee, 322 U.S. 143
(1944). For its strict application thereafter, see Haley v. Ohio, 322 U.S. 596 (1948).
2. 346 U.S. 156 (1953). The other two cases since 1951 are: Gallegos v. Nebraska,
342 U.S. 55 (1951), and Stroble v. California, 343 U.S. 181 (1952).
3. Supra note 1.
4. For a comprehensive analysis and discussion of the law of confession admissibility
today, see Inbau and Reid, LIE DETECTION AND CRIMINA. INTERROGATION (3d ed., 1953),
which is the source of the foregoing summary of the subject.
